For years, a US flag was painted on the floor of Iran’s presidential compound, strategically located so that visitors would trample over the Stars and Stripes on their way in.
Shortly before Donald Trump’s inauguration, however, the flag was quietly removed. There was no official explanation from Iranian officials. But the move captured a quiet shift in Tehran’s thinking, in what is shaping up to be its most consequential year since the 1980s Iran-Iraq war: with the country at its most vulnerable point in years, officials hope they can avoid confrontation and even strike a deal with the new president.
The return of their bête noire to the White House is happening just as Iran’s long nuclear stand-off with the west comes to a head. It also follows a year of conflict that has changed the power dynamics in the Middle East at Tehran’s expense, with Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu emboldened by a string of battlefield gains that dealt the Islamic republic and its regional proxies devastating blows.
Israel, which traded two rounds of tit-for-tat strikes with Iran last year, claims to have destroyed much of its air defences; Tehran’s main proxy, the Lebanese movement Hizbollah, has been debilitated; and the toppling of the Assad regime in Syria has robbed it of a key ally. With this in mind, analysts say Iran can ill-afford to antagonise Trump and risk more military conflict with Israel and even the US.
“It is a very critical year, largely because the strategic context for Iran has changed drastically,” said Vali Nasr, a professor at the Johns Hopkins School of Advanced International Studies. “What Iran has lost is a way of managing Israel and . . . its hand is weaker with the Europeans and the Americans.”
The expectation is that Trump, who in his first term abandoned the 2015 nuclear deal Tehran signed with world powers and ramped up sanctions in a “maximum pressure” campaign, will return to his hardline policies.
But there are also hints he may be willing to bargain. Trump has delegated his Middle East envoy Steve Witkoff to explore whether diplomatic accommodation with Iran is possible, saying last week that “it would really be nice if [tensions over Iran’s nuclear programme] could be worked out”.
Western diplomats say the government of reformist President Masoud Pezeshkian has for weeks signalled more willingness to agree to a negotiated settlement to secure relief and ease domestic economic pressure, but also because of Iran’s weakened position and desire to avoid military confrontation with the US and Israel.
But they warn that, if that fails, Iran is on a collision course with the west. European powers that opposed Trump’s maximum pressure during his first term have become more angry with Iran’s behaviour, including the continued expansion of its nuclear activity, its arms sales to Russia and its alleged targeting of citizens in the west.
With Iran enriching uranium close to weapons-grade level — and closer than it has ever been to having the capacity to produce nuclear bombs — diplomats say they want action not words.
The 2015 accord’s “sunset clauses” are set to expire in October, which will lift restrictions on Iran’s nuclear activities and in effect signal the termination of the moribund agreement.
As that date nears, a risk for Iran is that western powers trigger the so-called snapback process that would lead to the reimposition of UN sanctions and further international isolation if there is no alternative deal.
Inside Iran, reformists have begun public debates to pressure Ayatollah Ali Khamenei, the supreme leader, and the elite Revolutionary Guard to negotiate, arguing that this may be the regime’s last chance to avert a crisis.
Pezeshkian “has the opportunity to take significant steps for Iran”, said Hossein Marashi, a senior reformist politician, during a speech this month. “His first mission should be a new chapter in foreign policy. We no longer hold leverage in Lebanon, Syria or Iraq.”
Iranian analysts said, however, that Tehran does not want to be seen to negotiate out of desperation.
“While we resist US pressure, we will also signal a willingness to negotiate,” said a relative of Khamenei. “Iran is working to minimise actions that might provoke Washington, even if no agreement is eventually reached.”
The relative of Khamenei acknowledged that Israel’s attacks on Iran and the so-called “axis of resistance” of Tehran-backed militant groups, including Hizbollah and Hamas, had led Iranian leaders to reassess their perception of the republic’s power in the Middle East.
But he added that Tehran retains tools “to alter the battlefield”, without elaborating: “The Islamic republic has suffered blows, but there will be no strategic U-turns in its domestic and foreign policies.”
“The Iranians don’t see themselves as weak in the way in which they’re being portrayed. They have inherent weaknesses, there’s no question about it,” Nasr said. “But they estimate that there are constraints on Trump if he doesn’t pursue the diplomatic path, and that the risks are quite high for a military conflict that the US cannot then control.”
When Trump implemented his “maximum pressure” strategy against Iran during his first term, Iranian forces were blamed for sabotage attacks on tankers in the Gulf and a missile and drone strike in 2019 on Saudi oil infrastructure.
But Trump also displayed his unpredictability. After initially indicating that he was not willing to use military action, he in 2020 ordered the assassination of Qassem Soleimani, Iran’s most powerful commander, pushing the foes briefly to the brink of war.
Some experts said the blows to the axis, which have diminished Iran’s regional influence, could mean Tehran would be more willing to strike a deal with Trump to seek security guarantees that it would not be attacked by Israel.
Sanam Vakil, director of the Middle East programme at Chatham House, said Tehran needed to entice Trump into a deal quickly if it was to avoid more US “maximum pressure” and the threat of further Israeli strikes.
“Without offering something bigger, they risk a third round of strikes from Israel that will be supported by this US administration,” she said. “What’s at stake is the viability of the regime. The economic viability of the regime and their ability to rehabilitate themselves and build back legitimacy.”
